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THE TEXT AS A CRITICAL OBJECT: 
On theorising exegetic procedure in classroom-based critical discourse 
analysis
One of the reasons CDA calls itself critical is because its perspectives of discourse  
and  society  are  largely  derived  from  critical  social  theory.  Transferring  these  
perspectives  to  educational  contexts  requires  that  teachers  develop  workable  
pedagogic frameworks and procedures which apply CDA principles and practices to  
the reading and discussion of texts in the classroom.  If these are to be considered  
‘critical,’ it seems useful that these are also derived from critical social theory. This  
type  of  critical  theorisation  seems  to  be  underdeveloped  in  a  CDA which  relies  
principally on systemic functional linguistics for its procedural attitude to the text.  
This paper suggests a possible development of this space in which exegetic procedure  
and discussion are  theorised  from critical  perspectives  in  the thought  of  Adorno,  
Derrida  and  Habermas,  and  according  to  systemic  perspectives  in  the  work  of  
Foucault.  The paper also presents a framework of analysis for use by teachers and  
students which is based on these perspectives.
Key words critical  discourse analysis,  critical  social  theory,  systemic  functional 
linguistics, immanent critique, deconstruction, public sphere, power
Introduction
The theme of this paper arises from my own practice as a teacher on university undergraduate 
programmes in communication,  language, media and culture,  and from my interest  in the 
critical social theories which provide a backdrop to the field we know as critical discourse 
analysis  (CDA). As a teacher  I have found myself  drawn to the problem of applying the 
principles of CDA to classroom practice around texts, and of trying to develop a workable 
CDA framework for student led analyses and discussions of them.  In thinking about these 
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issues I have found certain perspectives in critical social  theory to be of particular use in 
trying to ground a procedural approach to the text, and it is these perspectives which are the 
subject of this paper.  In this  discussion I wish to present an alternative view of exegetic 
procedure in CDA which is not based on a Hallidayan systemic-functional classification of 
the text  (Halliday,  1978, 1989, 1994; Eggins & Martin,  1997).   The reasons for this  are 
twofold.  Firstly,  the  reliance  on  a  systemic-functional  model  of  the  text  does  not  seem 
entirely adequate to a mode of discourse analysis which, due to its relation with social theory, 
is  considered  to  be  ‘critical;’  and  secondly,  because  the  terminological  and  conceptual 
complexity of the Hallidayan model is such that it can be an obstacle to introducing CDA to a 
wider audience. This latter problem is one which a number of critical discourse analysts have 
noted.   Fairclough  (2003:  6),  for  example,  has  referred  to  the  ‘forbidding  technical 
terminology’  of  CDA,  and how work needs  to  be  done ‘to  recontextualise  this  body of 
research in ways which transform it, perhaps quite radically, into a practically useful form for 
educational purposes’ (Fairclough, 1999: 80).  Fowler (1996: 8-9) too has commented that 
CDA can be both ‘abstract and difficult,’ and that its concepts ‘need to be explained more 
clearly’ if students are to do effective critical work with texts.  Similar comments have made 
by Toolan (1997) and by Wallace (1992, 2003).
Turning to the first question, I am interested in exploring a theorisation of procedure 
which  can  be  applied  both  to  the  critical  reading  of  texts  and,  in  a  classroom,  to  the 
discussion which will often accompany this. By theorising these two things, one of my aims 
is to provide an approach to procedure in which a number of critical and poststructuralist 
perspectives are brought into dialogue.  I call this approach treating the Text as a Critical 
Object (TACO).  The chief theoretical influences for this are the theorists Theodor Adorno, 
Jacques Derrida, and Jürgen Habermas, and it is their perspectives which form the main part 
of this paper. Also relevant for his contribution to understandings of systems and power is 
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Michel Foucault, and aspects of his thought will be introduced in order to highlight some of 
the ‘systemic’ similarities which seem to exist in the work of these other thinkers, as well as 
in the work of Foucault himself.  Central to the interpretative model which I am proposing is 
a theoretical reworking of interpretative paradigms in CDA which is based on procedures 
which may be found in critical social theory. This concerns, in particular, a reformulation of 
the procedural paradigm of description, interpretation, and explanation which is associated 
with Fairclough’s three-dimensional view of discourse (Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995, 2001). 
The reason for focusing on Fairclough’s procedural model is that his is the most developed in 
relation to critical social theory.  In addition, it is arguably the paradigm with which CDA is 
most associated, and according to which its analyses of texts are carried out.
The role of social theory in CDA
One of the reasons CDA calls itself critical is because of its association with critical social  
theory.   For  example,  Fairclough  notes  that  a  characteristic  of  his  approach  ‘is  that  it  
combines a Bakhtinian theory of genre (in analysis of discourse practice) and a Gramscian 
theory  of  hegemony  (in  analysis  of  social  practice)’  (Fairclough,  1995:  2;  original 
parenthesis).  When we look at how CDA theorises itself, it is possible to see more clearly 
how  this  relationship  to  social  theory  is  established.   We  can  use  the  three  tiers  of 
Fairclough’s model of discourse to illustrate this (Fig. 1).  
Fig. 1. The relationship between discourse and social theory in CDA 
Text Halliday (SFL: dialectic of the text and the 
context)
Discourse practices Foucault (orders of discourse)
Bakhtin (intertextuality)
Pêcheux (interdiscourse)
Social practices Marx (ideology)
Gramsci (hegemony)
Althusser (ideological state apparatuses)
Foucault (power)
Based on Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2001) 
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There are three levels of discourse in Fairclough’s model: the text, discourse practices, and 
social practices.  Fairclough theorises each of these levels by reference to a particular body of 
thought.   At  the  level  of  discourse  practices  the  range  of  theorists  which  are  drawn on 
includes Foucault, Bakhtin and Pêcheux.  At the level of social practices it includes Marx, 
Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault again. Each thinker contributes a particular perspective to 
Fairclough’s conception of discourse. This range of influences is quite broad and the table 
represented in Fig. 1 is not exhaustive.  More theorists could be mentioned, particularly at the 
levels of discourse practices and social practices (see Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).  At 
the  level  of  the  text,  however,  this  is  not  the  case;  here  CDA  has  relied  more  or  less 
exclusively on Hallidayan systemic functional linguistics (SFL).  The reasons for this are 
twofold: not only does SFL provide a useful grammatical language of description,  it  also 
provides a theoretical model according to which textual analyses can be carried out, and this 
has made it attractive as a procedural model for CDA.  The theoretical model proposes a 
classification of the text in terms of its relationship to contexts of production and use.  These 
are well known as the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions of the text, and the 
field,  tenor  and  mode  dimensions  of  the  context  (see  Halliday,  1978,  1994;  Halliday  & 
Hasan, 1989; Eggins & Martin, 1997; Chouliaraki, 1998; Wallace, 2003).  
Fairclough  (1989,  1992,  2001)  has  chosen  to  reclassify  Halliday’s  textual 
metafunctions  and given them different  names.   He refers  to  the  experiential,  relational, 
expressive/identity,  and connective functions of texts,  although he also,  in places,  retains 
Halliday’s  terms  as  well  (Fairclough,  1992).  The  experiential  function  corresponds  to 
Halliday’s ideational function, and the relational and identity functions represent a division of 
Halliday’s  interpersonal  function  into  two (Fairclough,  1992:  64-5).   The  expressive  and 
identity functions seem to be the same.  They refer to the role of discourse in constituting or  
constructing identities (Fairclough, 1992: 168; 2001: 93). Finally,  Fairclough’s connective 
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function corresponds to Halliday’s textual function. In place of the field, tenor and mode, 
Fairclough  has  reformulated  and  developed  Halliday’s  context  dimensions  in  a  more 
rigorously socio-theoretical manner through his conception of the ‘order of discourse,’ a term 
which he derives from Foucault (1981).  This refers to  ‘the overall configuration of discourse 
practices of a society or one of its institutions’ (Fairclough, 1996: 70).  
Halliday’s systemic classification of the text and context is a fundamental statement 
regarding  the  manner  in  which  human  beings  construct  the  meaning  relations  of  their 
world(s).  Less explicitly recognised is that it is also a dialectical model in that it applies to 
language what the dialectic of Hegel applies to reason, and the dialectic of Marx applies to 
historical  materialism  (Hegel,  1998  [1822];  Marx  2000  [1859]).  It  is  in  the  Hallidayan 
dialectic between the text and the context that human beings make their world meaningful 
and comprehensible. The dialectical nature of the Hallidayan text-context classification and 
the theoretical relationship which it has with Hegelian and Marxist dialectics is one of the 
major factors which recommends SFL to CDA; indeed, it is what makes CDA the study of 
‘language as a form of social practice’ (Fairclough, 2001: 18).  
Despite  these  recommendations,  there  is  still  something  which  is  not  entirely 
satisfactory about the reliance on SFL for a critical theory of procedure at the level of the 
text. This is that despite its dialecticism systemic functional linguistics is not a critical social 
theory. The qualification of being a critical social theory is that it engages philosophically 
with  questions  regarding  the  historical,  political,  economic  and  cultural  nature  of  social 
being; its ideas and ideologies, its institutions and power structures, its social frameworks and 
meanings. By inserting itself into the debate about the nature and the place of reason, truth, 
knowledge and understanding in what is considered by many to be a post-Enlightenment age, 
a critical social theory is one which engages in the philosophical discourse of late modern 
society  (Habermas,  1987a;  Giddens,  1990;  Harvey,  1990;  Jameson,  1998;  Chouliaraki  & 
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Fairclough,  1999).   Within  the  framework  of  recent  western  philosophy  there  are  two 
traditions of critical social theory which interest this paper. One tradition extends from Hegel 
through  Marx  to  the  critical  theory  of  the  Frankfurt  School  and  the  other  extends  from 
Nietzsche through Heidegger to the poststructuralism of Foucault and Derrida. Hallidayan 
SFL, its dialectical nature notwithstanding, is not this type of social theory.  It follows then 
that if CDA is to theorise critical procedures for the analysis of texts, and to become, in the 
words of Rajagopalan (1999),  ‘critical  all  the way through,’  it  needs to look beyond the 
functional categories of SFL and to seek such procedures in critical social theory.  SFL might 
then become a linguistic resource in a critical theory of procedure, rather than, as it has done, 
become the procedure itself.  For the purposes of designing such a procedure there are, as I 
have indicated, three thinkers whose work seems particularly suited to this task.  They are 
Adorno, Derrida, and Habermas. Adorno and Derrida are important because of the procedural 
techniques of interpretation and problematisation which both of them adopt in their work, and 
Habermas is important because his thought is characterised by a concern for procedures of 
discussion.  These aspects of the work of each of these thinkers are illustrated in Fig. 2.  
Fig. 2. Critical Social Theory and the Text as a Critical Object
Adorno Procedure: immanent critique of objects
Derrida Procedure: deconstruction of texts
Habermas Discussion: public sphere; communicative action
Foucault System: subject positions; networks of power
Foucault is included in this list because procedures of interpretation and discussion 
are also ‘systemic;’ that is, they suggest a framework which is to be followed, and they occur 
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in contexts, such as classrooms, which are systemically organised and structured.  It is these 
structuring effects which make Foucault’s thought also important to this paper.  
Critical Reading:  Adorno and the immanent critique of the object
Adorno was a member of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists.  The Frankfurt School is 
most associated with the philosophical Marxism of Benjamin, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno 
himself,  and  more  recently  Habermas.   In  their  work  the  critical  theorists  undertook  an 
extended critique of German idealist  and materialist  philosophy.  This  took the form of a 
dialogic engagement with a wide range of philosophical positions in the thought of, among 
others, Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche.  In this process the critical theorists distanced themselves, 
to a greater or lesser degree, from a range of standard Hegelian as well as classical Marxist 
positions  on  the  nature  of  social  progress,  history,  subjectivism  and  truth,  while 
simultaneously  reformulating  and  reapplying  these  understandings  for  the  purposes  of 
elaborating a critical theory of society.  The critical theorists argued that any understanding of 
society had to be historically located; that is, located and practised within the confines of a 
materialist  conception  of  history  because,  in  their  view,  all  knowledge  is  historically 
conditioned.  They therefore rejected, as did Nietzsche (1968a), the idea that there was an 
objective reality which could be passively reflected upon, arguing instead that social theorists 
are themselves a part of social and historical processes and therefore unable to stand apart  
from  these  processes  (Held,  1990).  Although  all  knowledge  is  seen  as  historically 
conditioned,  Horkheimer,  Adorno  and  Marcuse  sought  to  develop  analytical  techniques, 
united under the title  ‘immanent  critique’  or ‘immanent  criticism,’  by which independent 
moments  of  critical  insight  might  be  made  possible:  ‘only  then  will  a  critical  social 
consciousness retain its freedom to think that things might be different some day’ (Adorno: 
1973: 323).  It is these techniques, which they all to some extent shared, that can provide an 
initial theoretical framework for the critical reading of texts.  
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There are a number of reasons why Adorno’s work is important.  First,  Adorno’s view of 
immanent critique was, theoretically, the most developed of the critical theorists, based as it 
was upon his own interpretative philosophy of ‘negative dialectics.’  Second, he shared and 
also  developed  theoretically  Nietzsche’s  multiperspectival  approach  to  knowledge 
(Nietzsche,  1968a,  1968b;  Best  &  Kellner,  1991,  1997),  but  rather  than  calling  it 
‘multiperspectivism,’  Adorno named  his  a  ‘constellations’  perspective.   Third,  immanent 
critique  and  constellations  may  be  said  to  anticipate  respectively  Derrida’s  approach  to 
deconstruction and at least some aspects of the discourse ethics of Habermas, making Adorno 
a key thinker  in  forming a theoretical  link between the modernism of Habermas and the 
poststructuralism of Derrida (Ryan, 1982; Jay, 1984). A final reason for adopting Adorno is 
that of all the critical theorists his work has a practical textual dimension which is not present 
in the work of the other Frankfurt theorists.  This is because Adorno devoted much of his 
time to the study of mass culture and, within that, to the study of texts.  These textual studies 
included extended critical commentaries on American television programmes and television 
culture (Adorno, 1957, 1967), on the speeches and propaganda of American fascist agitators 
and  American  extremist  groups  (Adorno,  1994),  and  a  ‘content  analysis’  of  a  daily 
astrological  column in the  Los Angeles Times (ibid).  He also wrote a great deal on Jazz, 
classical  music,  and theatre  (Adorno, 2000).  Unlike Foucault,  whose studies of discourse 
largely bypassed texts and text analyses, Adorno took a keen interest in them. From a CDA 
perspective this seems promising.  
Although Adorno was interested in texts, and particularly in the texts of mass culture,  
he preferred  to  make  general  critical  commentaries  on them,  rather  than undertake  more 
systematic  discourse  analytical  studies  of  them.   Adorno was  not  interested  in  discourse 
analysis as such, or in discourse analytical procedures, but in giving an account of ‘specific 
stimuli [in texts] … and the presumptive effect of these stimuli’ in moulding ‘some ways of  
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their reader’s thinking’ (Adorno, 1994: 54; see also Crook, 1994: 25-28).  Adorno reserved 
his more systematic interpretative procedures for philosophy (Adorno, 1967, 1973, 1977), 
and  it  is  in  his  approach  to  philosophical  questions  that  a  more  studied  orientation  to 
procedure can be found. He gave this the term ‘immanent critique.’ Immanent critique was 
common  to  much  Frankfurt  School  critical  theory,  and  it  was  Adorno  who  was  largely 
responsible for the way in which it was formulated by other members of the School, such as 
Horkheimer  and  Marcuse.   In  immanent  critique  ‘objects,’  such  as  social  institutions, 
ideological  concepts,  and  beliefs,  are  judged  according  to  whether  they  meet  their  own 
criteria of truth; that is, according to their own conceptions of what they think they are.  The 
role of immanent critique in critical theory is to ‘transform the concepts which it brings, as it 
were from outside, into what the object left to itself seeks to be, and confront it with what it  
is. It must dissolve the rigidity of the temporally and spatially fixed object into a field of  
tension of the possible and the real’ (Adorno, 2000: 177).  
What this means is that in the study of any object we must first record the object’s 
preferred idea of itself which it publicly seems to want to present, and then compare this self-
conception with what the object is (or does) in practice.  According to Adorno, if this is done 
in a systematic way, it may become possible to detect contradictions or disjunctures between 
the object’s  self-image  and what  the object  appears  to  be in  practice,  thus  allowing this 
conception to be problematised and possibly overturned. Adorno draws on the influence of 
Hegel in this respect, who said, ‘Genuine refutation must penetrate the power of the opponent 
and meet him on the ground of his strength; the case is not won by attacking him somewhere  
else and defeating him where he is not’ (Hegel cited in Adorno, 2000: 115).  
Importantly, the move to critique occurs from within; that is, from within the object’s 
self-conception (Adorno, 1973).  All objects, and here it is useful to think of texts, which are 
presented as having certain meanings, or as belonging to a certain meaning classification, 
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often have ‘definitions not contained in the definition of the class’ (Adorno, 1973: 150).  That 
is, objects cannot necessarily delimit what they are; they will often include elements which 
have  not  been  properly  or  fully  accounted  for.   For  example,  the  ideals  of  bourgeois 
capitalism – justice, equality, freedom, and fair exchange – when contrasted with how they 
operate in practice, will fail to live up to their own criteria, and in Adorno’s view are thereby 
negated (Held, 1990).  This is because bourgeois capitalism includes, as part of its praxis, 
features such as inequality, injustice and exploitation which undermine and problematise it’s 
idealised self-conception;  that  which ‘left  to itself,  [it]  seeks to be’ (Adorno, 1973: 150). 
Adorno observes that ‘[t]he concept of freedom lags behind itself as soon as we apply it  
empirically ... But because it must always be also the concept of what it covers, it is to be 
confronted with what it covers.  Such confrontation forces it to contradict itself’ (ibid: 151). 
Bourgeois capitalism thus fails against its own standards and ideals; it discloses ‘a pervasive 
discrepancy’ between what it actually is and the values it accepts (Horkheimer cited in Held, 
1990:  186).   Immanent  critique  is  therefore  a method for showing how an object’s  self-
conception may be a pretence which it denies or has chosen to ignore, and it is ‘through the 
analysis  of  [the  object’s]  form and  meaning’  that  these  potential  contradictions  may  be 
brought to the fore (Adorno, 1967: 32).  
If  Adorno  employs  immanent  critique  as  a  means  of  closely  analysing  and 
problematising the object, I would suggest that in any critical reading of a text we might do 
something  similar  and  use  a  procedure  of  immanent  critique  for  closely  analysing  and 
problematising the text. A procedure of immanent critique centred on a text would involve a 
detailed  comparison  of  how the  text  seems to  want  to  be read,  the  text’s  ‘dominant’  or 
‘preferred’ reading, with how the text appears in practice, its ‘texture’ (Halliday and Hasan, 
1976). The preferred reading refers to how, from the perspective of a critical reader, the text 
seems to want to be read. The term is derived from Hall (1990: 134), who uses it to refer to 
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how ‘the different  areas  of social  life  appear  to  be mapped out  into discursive domains, 
hierarchically  organised  into  dominant or  preferred meanings … a  pattern  of  ‘preferred 
readings’’ (original emphasis). Although Hall is not using this notion to refer specifically to 
texts, its use in this paper is not so different, because it is by means of the articulation and 
circulation  of  texts,  and the general  acceptedness  of  ‘preferred meanings’  that  discursive 
domains  are  constituted.  The  notion  of  a  preferred  reading,  or  a  generally  accepted 
interpretation, is not unique to Hall.  Eco (1992: 144) has referred to ‘a minimal paradigm of 
acceptability  of  an  interpretation,’  and  Derrida  (1988:  146)  to  ‘a  strong  probability  of 
consensus  in  the  interpretation  of  texts  … [a]  minimal  consensus.’   The term ‘preferred 
reading’ also appears in CDA; Janks and Ivanič (1992: 307), for example, use this term to 
refer  to  how ‘all  texts  work to  ‘anchor’  some meanings  in  preference to  others.’   When 
juxtaposing the preferred reading with the ‘textured’ meaning modalities of the text, the point 
is to record whether there seem to be any points of unevenness between the preferred reading 
and these modalities.  First, what does the text seem to be saying?  Second, having examined 
it very closely, how well does the text succeed in saying it?  In this way, the perception which 
the text has of itself – its preferred reading – might be problematised.  
Adorno’s negative dialectics, like the philosophy of Nietzsche, is non-totalising; that 
is, it rejects the idea of a correspondence between the subject and full comprehension of the 
object; an identical knowledge of the thing itself (Jay, 1977, 1984).  Adorno thought of this as 
a fiction, and gave it the name ‘identity thinking’ (Adorno, 1973).  Identity thinking stops at 
the appearance of the object.  That is, it accepts the object at face value and does not look 
beyond how the object wants to be received or understood.  To identity thinking Adorno 
opposes ‘non-identity thinking.’  Non-identity thinking is a kind of deconstructive thinking; it 
‘sets out to free dialectics from affirmative traits’ (Held, 1990: 203), that is, from traits which 
(a) presuppose dialectical reconciliation and (b) which overemphasise the role of the subject 
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in the evolution of history.  Non-identity thinking also enables us to (c) free our thought from 
systematising philosophies, or the totalising tendencies of ‘sacred texts’ (Adorno, 1973: 55); 
that is, philosophies and texts which seek to explain the totality of the real, such as Hegelian 
idealism, Marxist determinism and scientific positivism. In Adorno’s words, ‘it lies in the 
definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total.  This is 
its form of hope’ (Adorno, 1973: 406).  For Adorno, it is the capacity of non-identity thinking 
to identify and isolate possible points of unevenness within the object that makes non-identity 
thinking critical.   The procedural means by which this occurs is the practice of immanent 
critique: ‘[i]mmanent criticism of [objective] phenomena seeks to grasp, through the analysis 
of their form and meaning … a heightened perception of the thing itself’ (Adorno, 1967: 32). 
In  these  terms  immanent  critique  is  potentially  a  procedure  for  mapping  and 
problematising texts, and for developing a heightened critical perception of them. If ‘text’ is 
substituted  for  ‘object’  and ‘critical  reading’  for  ‘immanent  critique,’  negative  dialectics, 
non-identity thinking, and immanent  critique can be made to take on a more textual  and 
exegetic  complexion.   Adorno  seems  to  be  aware  of  this  potential  when  he  says, 
‘[p]hilosophy rests on the texts that it criticises, and it is in dealing with them that that the 
conduct of philosophy becomes commensurable with tradition. This justifies the move from 
philosophy to exegesis’ (Adorno, 1973: 55).   By calling for the immanent critique of the 
sacred texts of western philosophy Adorno thus anticipates  the deconstruction of western 
metaphysics by Derrida.  
Constellations
Complementing  immanent  critique  in  negative  dialectics  are  ‘constellations.’   This  is  the 
Nietzschean idea that in order to reach any approximation of the object, one representation 
will not do (Best & Kellner, 1991). What is necessary are multiple representations of the 
object, or a variety of views around it.  In Adorno’s words, ‘[a]s a constellation, theoretical 
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thought circles the concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it might fly open like the lock 
of a well-guarded safe-deposit box: in response not to a single key or a single number, but to 
a  combination  of  numbers’  (Adorno,  1973:  163).   Constellations,  by  bringing  together 
various  perspectives  on  the  object  therefore  provide  a  basis  for  knowledge  formation: 
‘philosophy has to bring its elements … into changing constellations, or, … into changing 
trial combinations which can be read as an answer’ (Adorno, 1977: 127). What Adorno and 
some of his interpreters seem to miss is the possibility of each element of the constellation 
issuing from a different subject, rather than from a solitary subject-philosopher who through 
the medium of a philosophical critique trials different interpretive combinations on the object. 
Adorno’s method is therefore not multi-subjective. This is the route which is instead taken by 
Habermas  (1984,  1987a,  1987b),  whose  theory  of  communicative  action  rests  upon  an 
Adornian intersubjective constellation derived from the validity claim perspectives of more 
than one subject; that is, upon a notion of ‘intersubjective’ as opposed to ‘subject-centred’ 
reason.  It is in the multi-subjective potential of Adorno’s approach that his constellations 
perspective may be said to anticipate in some ways the discourse ethics of Habermas.   
According to Adorno, it is through the juxtaposition of constellations with immanent 
critique  that  it  becomes  possible  to  illuminate  aspects  of  ‘unintentional  reality’  (Adorno, 
1977: 127).  In other words, to see what is not usually seen when looking at  the object,  
because of the tendency towards identity thinking and an acceptance of the way in which the 
object wishes to be received.  In relation to the text this tendency towards identity thinking 
may be interpreted as a willingness to look no further than the preferred reading and how the 
text seems to want to be read.  If the text however is made the subject/object of an immanent 
critique  in  combination  with a  constellations  perspective,  the following educational  gloss 
seems possible.  In a critical reading the perspectives of students may be said to represent a 
constellation  of  opinions  about  a  text;  this  is  because  the  text  has  been  read  from  the 
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individual  perspective  of  each  member  of  the  class.   In  the  ensuing  discussion  these 
perspectives are made public in the contexts of group and open-class discussion, as well as in 
the  context  of  a  possible  problematisation  of  the  text.  This  problematisation  will  occur 
whenever the text can be shown to include elements which do not seem to be properly or 
fully accounted for.  If this can be demonstrated, the text may be said to project a meaning 
which is not part of its preferred reading, and which therefore seems to undermine its intent.
Critical reading: Derrida and deconstruction 
The  second  element  in  developing  a  theorisation  of  procedure  is  Derrida’s  method  of 
deconstruction.  Derrida  has  written  of  method  in  many  places.  For  example,  in  Of 
Grammatology  (1976), particularly in the section on ‘The Exorbitant Question of Method’ 
(pp. 157-164), in  Positions (1981a), in  Limited Inc. (1988) and in  Points (1995); and it is 
these texts which I have used as my principal sources.  I have adopted a similar attitude to 
Derrida and deconstruction as that expressed by Fairclough (1992: 38) in relation to Foucault 
and discourse.  Fairclough argues that one cannot simply apply Foucault’s ideas on discourse 
to CDA; it is rather ‘a matter of putting Foucault’s perspective to work’ within it.  I would 
also say then that you cannot simply apply deconstruction to critical reading.  It must also be 
put  to  work,  and  this  requires  adapting  it  conceptually  while  attempting  to  preserve  its 
procedural integrity.  
According  to  Derrida,  to  do  deconstruction  requires  more  than  anything  else  the 
capacity  to  ask  questions:   ‘The  only  attitude  (the  only  politics  –  judicial,  medical,  
pedagogical, and so forth) I would  absolutely  condemn is one which directly or indirectly, 
cuts off the possibility of an essentially interminable questioning, that is, an effective and thus 
transforming questioning’  (Derrida, 1995: 239).  His work is characterised is many places by 
a marked critical forthrightness.  In Points (1995), for example, he declares that ‘The critical 
idea  …  must  never  be  renounced,’  that  it  is  ‘one  of  the  forms  and  manifestations’  of 
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deconstruction (ibid: 357), and that in order to resist the ‘danger’ of the power of the press 
‘one must exercise one’s critical judgement, speak, study, respond, increase the number of 
examples, create counter-powers, and above all invent new spaces and new forms, new types 
of publication and communication – and we must begin now preparing ourselves and students 
to do this’ (Derrida, 1995: 449).   Derrida has also used the term ‘critical reading’ to describe 
deconstruction.    It  first  appears in  Of Grammatology  (1976).   Here Derrida talks  of the 
method  of  deconstruction  as  a  ‘doubling  commentary;’  that  is,  first,  as  a  descriptive 
commentary  of  how the  text  wants  to  be  read  (the  reading  of  minimal  consensus)  and, 
second, as a fine-grained commentary which engages in and problematises the first.  It is here 
that he notes, ‘This moment of doubling commentary should no doubt have its place in  a 
critical reading’ (Derrida, 1976: 158; emphasis added).  But he goes on: 
To recognize and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and requires all the 
instruments of traditional criticism.  Without this recognition and this respect, critical 
production would risk developing in  any direction at  all  and authorize  itself  to say 
almost anything.   But this  indispensable guardrail  has always only  protected,  it  has 
never opened a reading.  (Derrida, 1976: 158).
The preferred reading, this indispensable guardrail, is therefore the position from which 
deconstruction begins; it is the point at which the text may be opened to its other possibilities. 
In  these  terms  deconstruction  is  a  means  of  preventing  the  closure  of  the  text  and  of 
problematising  its  apparent  self-certainties.   According  to  Derrida,  ‘our  reading  must  be 
intrinsic and remain within the text’ (Derrida, 1976: 159).  That is, it is not enough simply to 
be in disagreement with the text; there has to be some critical demonstration which engages 
the text from within. As Critchley (1999a: 26) puts it, ‘[a] deconstructive reading must … 
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remain  within the limits  of textuality,  hatching its  eggs within the flesh of the host.’  A 
deconstructive reading adheres to a set of principles.  These are outlined in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3.  Derrida’s principles of critical reading
• A critical reading respects how the text seems to want to be read; it adheres to norms of 
minimal intelligibility; it affirms what the text seems to want to say;
• it takes place within the bounds of the text; it is intrinsic to the text;
• it is a double reading; it is a doubling commentary;
• it maps the text;
• it inscribes itself upon the text; 
• it reinscribes the text through rigorous commentary; 
• it isolates features of the text which appear problematic to the dominant reading;
• it shows the text what it does not seem to know; it reveals the text’s self-transgression – its 
‘structural unconscious;’
• it problematises; it interrupts;
• a critical reading deconstructs.
(Based on Derrida, 1976, 1981a, 1988, 1995)
Derrida first outlines his reading method in Of Grammatology where he undertakes a 
deconstructive  reading  of  Rousseau’s  Essay  on  the  Origin  of  Languages.   In  this  text 
Derrida’s argument  hinges  upon the ambivalent  meaning of  the French word  supplément 
(supplement) in Rousseau’s text.  Rousseau wishes to dismiss writing as a mere appendage of 
speech, a degraded and debasing ‘supplement’ which undermines the purity of the spoken 
word in its proximity to thought and reason.  But Derrida notes that  supplément has two 
meanings.   On the one hand, it  can mean something added on;  and this  is  the sense,  or 
‘centre,’ which Rousseau wishes to give it.  On the other, it can also mean ‘ in-the-place-of; 
… as if one fills a void’ (Of Grammatology: 1976: 145; original emphasis).  On this logic the 
supplement is only added on because there is something missing from the thing that it  is  
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being added on to; speech in this case.  The supplement is therefore not simply an addition to  
speech but also a necessary restoration or replacement of something that is missing in speech. 
Writing in this perspective both adds to speech and restores it; it is not merely an appendage. 
Derrida by careful argument attempts to show how Rousseau has privileged only the additive 
sense of supplément and made this the centre of his text.  But for Derrida, supplément is an 
‘undecidable’ which cannot be faithful to the centre of meaning which Rousseau wishes it to 
have.  Using  ‘levers’  which  are  therefore  supplied  by  Rousseau’s  text,  Derrida  turns 
Rousseau’s text back on itself  and causes it  to confront  its own pathology,  or ‘structural 
unconscious’ (Derrida, 1988: 73).  Derrida thus imitates the critical gesture of Adorno.  When 
confronted with itself, the text may fail to live up to its concept – the self-image which is the  
‘reading of minimal consensus.’  
Derrida demonstrates, on the basis of meticulously close and careful readings of many 
of these texts, for example of Plato, Rousseau and more recently John Austin that far from 
being closed and transparent systems of meaning, these texts are often contradictory and self-
problematising,  and  that  they  may  be  made  to  slip  from  their  preferred  intentions  (see 
Derrida,  1976,  1981b,  1988;  Norris,  1987;  Harland,  1993).   This  is  the  move  of 
deconstruction. Often this move will turn on the identification of a fragment – a word or 
phrase in a text – which is considered marginal and unimportant to the main argument, and is  
perhaps only in the text as an aside or secondary observation, and showing how this fragment 
may contain meanings and implications which if brought forward and placed alongside the 
text’s main argument may be seen to undermine that argument, to disturb its self-assumed 
harmony,  and  even  overturn  it.  Derrida  applies  this  methodology  generally  to  the 
philosophical texts that he reads.  
While this is the method preferred by Derrida for undertaking a deconstruction of 
philosophical texts, it would be unwise to follow this particular deconstructionist path too 
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closely.  Firstly, unlike deconstruction, the model of CDA which this paper proposes is not 
concerned with metaphysical critique.  Secondly, and more significantly, Derrida’s view of 
discourse,  like  that  of  Foucault’s,  has  the  flaw that  it  contains  a  rather  narrow view of 
discourse. Where Foucault often seems sententially preoccupied with ‘statements’ (Foucault, 
1989  [1972];  Fairclough,  1992),  Derrida  seems  preoccupied  with  the  metaphorical 
ambivalence  of  single  words  and phrases,  such as  supplément in  the  work  of  Rousseau, 
pharmakon in the work of Plato, and parasitic or fictional speech acts in the work of John 
Austin, and it is on these that his deconstructions tend to turn (see Derrida, 1976, 1981, 1988; 
Harland, 1993).  Derrida shows little concern for the broader meaning modalities of texts, 
such as  lexical  collocation  and chaining,  grammatical  and rhetorical  features,  image  and 
semiosis, for example.  There is also little regard for the social contexts in which texts are 
produced and in which they circulate, or for the ideological and discursive frameworks to 
which they refer. Derrida’s view of discourse is therefore quite a restrictive one for CDA, 
even  as  it  is  painstakingly  textual.  If  CDA  is  to  adopt  the  procedural  methodology  of 
deconstruction,  there  is  a  need then  to  broaden its  focus,  so  that  these  wider  aspects  of 
discourse and text may be brought into consideration. 
A central point for Derrida is that the first reading should not be understood as the 
reproduction of a primary or true meaning of the text: ‘the originary and true layer of a text’s 
intentional meaning; … No, this commentary is  already  an interpretation’ (Derrida, 1988: 
143; original emphasis).   It is important, however, that the first interpretation should attempt 
to reproduce the dominant or preferred reading of the text in the form of a minimal consensus 
concerning the  text’s  intrinsic  intelligibility;  ‘no research  is  possible  in  a  community  … 
without the prior search for this minimal  consensus’ (ibid: 146), and therefore no critical 
reading would be possible either.  This first and affirming moment of reading represents for 
Derrida nothing less than a ‘principle of reason’ and ‘deontology’  in the reading of texts 
18
(Derrida, 1995: 427 and 430),  ‘[o]therwise,’ he writes, ‘one could indeed just say anything at 
all and I have never accepted saying, or encouraging others to say, just anything at all’ (ibid: 
144-45; see also Critchley, 1999a: 24; Derrida, 1976: 158). With this understanding Derrida’s 
procedural schematic for deconstruction may be said to involve two stages of interpretation, 
which when combined with Adorno’s perspective of immanent critique, may be utilised as a 
preliminary basis for a procedure of critical reading.  This is outlined in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4.  TACO: a preliminary procedure
1. Descriptive interpretation: the preferred reading. What is the preferred reading (the main 
message of the text; the reading which accords with the way the text seems to want to be  
read; the reading of minimal consensus)?
2. Deconstructive (or immanent) interpretation: the preferred reading measured against the 
texture  of  the  text.  Does  any  aspect  of  the  texture  of  the  text  appear  to  contradict  or 
undermine the preferred reading?
In this procedure the first reading reproduces the preferred reading as a first stage of 
interpretation.   The  second  reading  holds  a  mirror  to  the  first  and  through  a  rigorous 
examination of the text looks for possible ‘blind spots’ and incongruities which may have 
been passed over or neglected and which seem problematic to the first reading.  This is the 
second  stage  of  interpretation  in  which  text’s  immanent  features  are  juxtaposed  to  the 
preferred reading. Questions which might be asked from this perspective include: ‘What is 
the preferred reading, and how far does the text itself seem to replicate this reading?  Do any 
incongruencies appear as a result of the second reading which seem to have been glossed 
over or ignored in the production of the first? 
In the TACO perspective the texture of the text includes the visual layout and how 
this appears;  the lexical,  grammatical  and genre dimensions of the text and the meanings 
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these suggest; and the overall frames of social reference within which the text seems to make 
sense.   These  social  frames  refer  to  frameworks  of  understanding in  the  production  and 
interpretation of texts and relate to conceptual notions of, for example, gender, politics, the 
economy,  family,  health,  beauty,  business,  income,  age,  success,  failure,  etc.   Habermas 
(1984, 1987b) refers to these notions as being part of our ‘lifeworld knowledge;’ Bourdieu 
(1991)  uses  the  term  ‘habitus,’  and  Fairclough  (1989,  2001)  has  referred  to  ‘Members 
Resources.’  Thompson, in reference to Bourdieu’s habitus, defines this as incorporating ‘a 
set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways.  The dispositions 
generate practices, perceptions and attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously 
coordinated  or  governed  by  any  ‘rule’’  (Thompson,  1991:  12).   If  Derrida’s  doubling 
commentary is to account for the wider meaning modalities of the text and the lifeworld 
practices, perceptions and attitudes referred to by Thompson, it needs more procedural detail 
about, for example, the frame of the text (where it begins and ends), the topic (what is it?), 
and the subject position which is set up for the reader.  If these dimensions are added to 
Derrida’s procedural framework, it looks like this:
Fig. 5.  The Text as a Critical Object
1. Descriptive Interpretation:  the frame of the text; the visual  organisation of the text; the 
topic; the preferred reading and the reading position.
2. Representative Interpretation: interpretation of the image, grammar, vocabulary and genre 
choices of the text.
3. Social  Interpretation:   the  social  context(s)  which  the  text  seems  to  be  a  part  of:  e.g. 
contexts  of  gender,  race,  economy,  politics,  family,  class,  income,  age,  sex,  property, 
geography, etc.
4. Deconstructive  Interpretation:  aspects  of  the  descriptive,  representative  and  social 
dimensions of the text which appear to contradict or undermine the preferred reading.
20
This, in brief, is the critical reading procedure which I call TACO.  In some respects 
these stages may be thought of as an ‘unfolding’ of Derrida’s procedure for deconstruction, 
and  also  of  Adorno’s  procedure  for  immanent  critique.   The  first  stage  corresponds  to 
Derrida’s first reading in which the preferred reading is reproduced.  It also corresponds to 
Adorno’s identification of the self-image of the object in immanent critique.  The second, 
third and fourth stages correspond to Derrida’s second reading where the texture of the text is 
studied in closer detail.  Again,  these stages may be said to correspond to what I call  the 
‘mirror stage’ in immanent critique where the object is confronted with its ‘self.’  The close, 
immanent, reading of the text is most concentrated at the representative interpretation stage 
where the discourse features of the text are considered.   This stage may be said to act a 
textual anchor for the third and fourth stages of the reading. That is, it is in relation to the 
second stage that interpretation at the third and fourth stages is made possible.  Moreover,  
because the social and deconstructive interpretations take place by way of the text, this has 
the further implication that all of the stages in this procedure are therefore dependent upon 
the text and are not separate from it.  The full procedure is set out below.
The Text as a Critical Object
1. Descriptive interpretation: the frame of the text, the visual organisation of the text, the 
topic, the reading position, the preferred reading, and the ideal reader.
2. Representative interpretation: interpretation of the image, grammar, vocabulary and 
genre choices of the text. 
3. Social interpretation:  the social context(s) which the text seems to be a part of: e.g. 
contexts of gender, race, disability, economy, politics, family, class, income, age, sex, 
property, geography etc.
4. Deconstructive interpretation: aspects of the descriptive, representative and social 




• What is the frame of the text and how does the text look? 
• What is the topic?
• How is the topic being presented (e.g. formal, informal, persuasive, aggressive, angry, 
friendly, humorous, comic, etc.)?
• What is the preferred reading (the main message of the text; the reading which accords 
with the way the text seems to want to be read; the reading of minimal consensus)?
• Who might be the ideal reader of this text? E.g. A person who … 
2. Representative interpretation
• What social values can be attached to the discourse features of the text (image/ 
vocabulary/grammar/genre)? 
Image
1. How is the text organised visually? E.g. is it in columns or is it a single block of text? Are 
words written in different sized fonts?  
2. Does the text use words and pictures? If so, what is the balance between words and 
pictures?  Where are words and pictures in relation to one another?
3. If the text is a combination of visual and written modes, or is written in a variety of 
formats, what is on the left (in the GIVEN position)?  What is on the right (in the NEW 
position)? What is located in the upper part of the text (in the IDEAL position)? What is 
located in the lower part of the text (in the REAL position)? 
4. What are the effects of these choices on the text?
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Vocabulary
1. What kind of vocabulary is used in the text? E.g. formal/informal, positive/negative, 
casual/dramatic, emotional/serious.
2. What semantic fields (word families) do vocabulary choices belong to?
3. What vocabulary is associated with the participants in the text?  Do these choices create a 
particular impression of the participants?
4. Is there any vocabulary which seems very important?
5. What words are given capital letters, italicised, underlined, put in inverted commas? 
6. What are the effects of these choices on the text?
Grammar 
1. What tenses are used in the text?  Do any of these seem very important?
2. Does the text use ‘we’, ‘you’ or ‘I’? When and how does the text use them? 
3. Are there any nominalisations in the text?  When are they used? 
4. When are active and passive constructions used?  Are there any common themes attached 
to the use of these different voices? What is usually foregrounded or backgrounded in 
these constructions? Are the agents animate or inanimate? 
5. In the text as a whole which information is put first? What is thematised? 
6. What are the effects of these choices on the text?
Genre
1. To what genre does the text belong?  (advertisement, news report, narrative, political 
statement, notice etc?).  Is there mixing of genres?  
2. If there is mixing of genres, what are the effects of these choices on the text?
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3. Social interpretation
• What social frameworks is the text a part of (e.g. gender, race, economy, business, 
politics, family, class, income, age, sex, property, geography, etc.)?
• What typical kinds of social knowledge do these frameworks suggest?
4. Deconstructive interpretation
• Does  any  aspect  of  the  text’s  structure  (descriptive,  representative,  social)  appear  to 
contradict or undermine the text’s preferred reading?
The questions listed under each stage will need some explanation but are not entirely 
unfamiliar to those which can be found in other models of CDA (e.g. Fowler et al, 1979; 
Fairclough, 1989, 2001; Wallace, 1992, 2003). Considering the framework as a whole, a key 
difference from these other models is that some aspects of multimodal analysis have been 
incorporated into it, particularly in relation to image.  These image features are derived from 
the multimodal perspectives of Kress and van Leeuwen (1996, 1998; see also Kress, 2000) 
and I would encourage interested readers to refer to the cited references for an explanation of 
relevant terms.  The other main difference is that this framework is not proceduralised in 
terms of the Hallidayan classification of the text which was discussed earlier.  This I feel 
makes the framework more accessible to use because it is no longer a characteristic of the 
procedure that the interpretation of different discourse features is dependent upon relating 
them to Hallidayan metafunctions of meaning or, as was noted for Fairclough’s approach, to 
experiential, relational, identity and connective values.  It is the range of meaning relations 
which the Hallidayan classification implies  which can make Fairclough’s procedure quite 
difficult to apply and use, and is one of the reasons why I have sought alternatives. In Fig. 6 
Fairclough’s procedure is juxtaposed with my own. This table shows more clearly how the 
TACO procedure differs from as well as corresponds to his. 
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Fig. 6.  Fairclough’s CDA and TACO
Fairclough’s CDA TACO
Descriptive interpretation: the frame of the 
text, the visual organisation of the text, the 
topic, the preferred reading, reading 
position, and ideal reader.
Description and interpretation of the formal 
linguistic properties of texts. E.g. 
experiential, relational, expressive/identity, 
and connective values of the vocabulary and 
grammar dimensions of the text. Representative interpretation: description 
and interpretation of the immanent features 
of the text -  image, grammar, vocabulary 
and genre.Interpretation of the relationship between 
productive and interpretative discursive 
processes and the text.  
Explanation of the relationship between 
discursive processes and social processes.  
Social interpretation:  the social context(s) 
which the text seems to be a part of; e.g. 
contexts of gender, race, disability, 
economy, politics, family, class, income, 
age, sex, property, geography, etc.
Deconstructive interpretation: aspects of the 
descriptive, representative and social 
dimensions of the text which appear to 
contradict or undermine the preferred 
reading.
With  Fig.  6  it  is  possible  to  suggest  some further  procedural  differences  between 
Fairclough’s framework and my own.  The first of these is that taken as a whole the TACO 
framework  is  differently  ‘synchronised’  to  Fairclough’s.  In  his  procedure  detailed 
consideration and interpretation of the discourse features of the text are incorporated into his 
description stage. The move to the detail of the text in Fairclough’s model is therefore an 
immediate  one;  and for  this  reason it  seems ‘bottom-up.’   In  my own procedure  I  want 
readers to develop a broader understanding and overview of the text prior to moving to a 
more detailed analysis of it and so at the descriptive interpretation stage the focus is on how 
the text seems to be operating as a textual event.  By this I mean how the text in the view of  
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the reader seems to wish to be received.   The questions at this stage are therefore broadly 
evaluative of how the text is orienting itself to the reader.  How does the text look, what is the 
text trying to say, what is the topic, and what kind of person does the text seem to have been 
produced for? Because Fairclough does not seem to incorporate this type of orientation to the 
text, his procedure in the way that it is constructed might be said to bypass the first reading of 
a Derridean/Adornian approach and to begin at the second more detailed one.  His procedure 
is therefore not a doubling commentary or immanent critique in the sense which has been 
presented here.
Another difference is that I have presented the deconstructive interpretation in my 
framework as  being  an additional  stage which  extends beyond Fairclough’s  three  stages. 
While comparisons of this kind may be somewhat arbitrary, the reason for presenting it in 
this  way  is  to  show  that  while  the  principles  of  CDA  can  be  seen  to  overlap  with 
deconstruction and with immanent critique, the destabilisation of the self-certainties of the 
text  is  not  an  absolute  requirement  of  a  TACO approach.   This  also  means  that  in  this 
approach a reading can still be critical even when the text is not deconstructed.  A key aspect 
of this  approach is  that  it  looks to  examine the discursive ways  in  which human beings 
construct  the  world  in  the  way that  they  do (Foucault,  1980;  Smith  and Deemer,  2000; 
Pennycook, 2001). That is, critical interpretation as a process of ‘discursive mapping’ which 
explores our enmeshment in the textual construction of social life (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Derrida,  1988;  Foucault,  1989  [1972];  Pennycook,  1994;  Kress,  1996;  Jameson,  1998). 
Discursive mapping is the staged process by which a text becomes a critical object.  
The deconstructive  interpretation in TACO comes at  the point  where a discursive 
mapping of the text has already occurred, that is, via the first three stages of the framework. 
But the deconstructive interpretation will not be automatic because not all  texts will lend 
themselves to it.  I am thinking here of mundane or purely informational texts, for example, 
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bus tickets, fire notices, no smoking signs, or instructions for installing a piece of software. 
That  some  texts  may  not  lend  themselves  to  a  deconstructive  interpretation  is  not  just 
confined to mundane texts however.  The same will also be true of elaborate texts such as 
newspaper articles, advertisements, web pages, and other texts of a more complex design, 
which having gone through a process of critical reading may be found to say exactly what 
they seem to intend to say.  But even if this is the outcome, and the text is not deconstructed, 
the purpose is to take the interpretation of the text to that point, to its deconstructive ‘rim,’ 
because what is achieved by going through the first three stages is a systematic account of the 
way the text appears to construct, reconstruct and generally make sense of that part of the 
reality to which it belongs.  The process of discursive mapping is illustrated in Fig. 7.  
Fig. 7.  Discursive Mapping
1. Descriptive interpretation
2. Representative interpretation  Discursive mapping
3. Social interpretation
4. Deconstructive interpretation
This  illustration  shows  how  our  lifeworld  knowledge/habitus/MR  is  not  just  an 
element of the social interpretation but is inherent to each of the interpretative stages of the 
procedure,  including  the  deconstructive  one.  All  interpretations  depend  upon  lifeworld 
knowledge.  Without this knowledge interpretation could not occur, and discursive mapping 





Critical reading and discussion: Habermas and the public sphere
The final element in a theorisation of procedure relates not to exegesis but to discussion.  I 
will make some observations on discussion and its relationship to procedure which have been 
suggested by Habermas’s accounts of communicative action in  the public sphere (Habermas, 
1984,  1987a,  1987b,  1989a,  1989b,  1992,  1996).  It  is  from Habermas  that  a  procedural 
theorisation  of  discussion  which  is  applicable  to  the  classroom  may  be  derived.   In 
Habermas’s  view,  the  societal  public  sphere  is  in  crisis  due  to  the  colonisation  of  the 
lifeworld by instrumental reason. Instrumental reason represents a form of domination, and if 
people are to be freed from domination, it is necessary to struggle against this tendency and 
to preserve and maintain discursive spaces within the lifeworld.  Habermas discusses this in 
terms of the rediscovery of the political public sphere, or ‘civil society,’ which is ‘constituted 
by voluntary unions outside the realm of the state and the economy’  (Habermas, 1992: 454). 
It is in this public sphere that ‘there can come into being a discursive formation of opinion 
and will on the part of a public composed of the citizens of a state’ (ibid: 446).  The public 
sphere  includes  ‘churches,  cultural  associations,  academies,  independent  media,  debating 
societies,  groups  of  concerned  citizens,  grass-roots  petitioning  drives,  occupational 
associations,  political  parties,  labour  unions,  and  “alternative  institutions”’  (ibid:  446). 
Although  not  included  in  this  list,  the  classroom  can  be  conceived  as  one  such  space. 
According to Fraser (1992), the Habermasian public sphere ‘designates a theatre … in which 
political participation is enacted through the medium of talk.  It is the space in which citizens 
deliberate  about  their  common affairs,  and hence  an  institutionalised  arena  of  discursive 
interaction … it is a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle 
be critical of the state’ (Fraser,  1992: 110-11).  The public sphere also adheres to certain 
rules and conditions:  
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Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens.  A portion of the public 
sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons come together to 
form a public … Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest 
without being subject to coercion; thus with the guarantee that they may assemble and 
unite freely, and express and publicise their opinions freely. (Habermas, 1989b: 231)
In  Structural  Transformation  of  the  Public  Sphere (henceforth  STPS)  Habermas 
discusses the classical bourgeois public sphere of the 18th century.  He identifies this as a 
period of highly developed public sphere activity.  The public sphere at this time was able to 
perform its critical function very effectively because the institutions which made it up, the 
coffee houses, salons, table societies etc, operated according a number of institutional criteria 
which they held in common.  The first of these was that ‘they preserved a kind of social 
intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether’ 
(Habermas, 1989a: 50).  The mutual willingness to suspend status distinctions ‘was based on 
the justifiable trust that within the public – presupposing its shared class interest – friend or 
foe relations were impossible,’ and this allowed ‘reasonable forms of public discussion’ to 
occur (ibid:  131).  
The second criterion which the institutions of the public sphere held in common was 
that ‘discussion within such a public presupposed the problematisation of areas that until then 
had not been questioned’ (ibid: 36).  Until the 18th century the institutions which had held a 
monopoly of interpretation on philosophy, on literature, and on the arts had been the church 
and  the  state,  but  with  the  development  of  capitalism  these  ‘culture  products’  became 
commodities and ‘as commodities they became in principle generally accessible’ (ibid: 36). 
This meant that many topics which had hitherto not been opened to public interpretation and 
discussion became topics of discussion within the public sphere ‘in as much as the public 
defined its discourse as focusing on all matters of public concern’ (Calhoun, 1992: 13).  
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The third criterion which Habermas identifies as held in common by the institutions of 
the public sphere is that they were inclusive.  Anyone with access to cultural products (books, 
plays,  journals,  etc.)  ‘as  readers,  listeners,  and spectators  could  avail  themselves  via  the 
market of the objects that were subject to discussion’ (ibid: 37).  A key issue is that these 
objects  can  also  be  conceived as  texts.   If  the  objects  that  are  subject  to  discussion  are 
understood in  this  manner,  then  Habermas’s  perspective  can  be  seen  to  complement  the 
text/object perspectives of Adorno and Derrida.  Where Adorno and Derrida can be employed 
to theorise the procedure for reading texts, Habermas can be used to theorise the discussion of 
them.  If the main points of STPS are applied to a theorisation of discussion, the following 
‘conditions of discussion’ may be suggested (Fig. 8).   These conditions suggest theorised 
grounds for the possibility as well as the procedure of critical discussion in the public space 
of  the  university  classroom  and  may  be  understood  as  representing  an  initial 
recontextualisation of a discourse model of public space to such a classroom.
Fig. 8 TACO conditions of discussion: a public sphere approach
1. Discussants are bound by institutional norms of constraint; these include a 
disregard for social status between discussants, a respect for rights of participation, 
and the expectation of intersubjective communication;
2. A critical discussion involves the problematisation of areas that are not usually 
questioned; 
3. A critical discussion illuminates some aspect of perceived reality from the 
perspective of different discussants; a critical discussion is a constellation of views;
4. The object of a critical discussion is a text;
5. A critical discussion is, in principle, open to anyone; a critical discussion is 
inclusive.
Habermas’s  first  reaction  in  STPS  and  then  in  later  works  such  as  Theory  and 
Practice (1974) and Legitimation Crisis (1976) was to determine how it would be possible to 
reconstruct a critical discourse in the midst of the technocratic rise of instrumental reason.  In 
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STPS he argues for greater democratisation within institutions; ‘their inner structure must first 
be  organised  in  accord  with  the  principle  of  publicity  …  to  allow  for  unhampered 
communication and public rational-critical debate’ (Habermas, 1989a: 209).  Not satisfied 
with this solution, however, mainly because of what he sees as a continued tendency towards 
a discourse of the subject, he increasingly turns towards language and an investigation of the 
intersubjective grounds of communication.  
An important concomitant development in the process of his thought at this time is the 
conceptual  distinction  he makes between a systems world and a  lifeworld.   The systems 
world  is  the  world  of  technocratic  consciousness  and  instrumental  reason,  of  systemic 
solutions  to  systemic  problems;  the  lifeworld  is  the  world  of  personal  relationships  and 
communicative action.   For Habermas, the early Frankfurt  School, including himself,  had 
placed too much emphasis on the instrumental rationalisation of society to the extent that any 
potential for emancipation appeared etiolated and flattened; their collective mistake, in his 
view, had been to generalise instrumental reason to the point where it became representative 
of reason as a whole (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). In this context instrumental reason, 
the reason of technocracy and bureaucracy, is individualised because it is primarily realised 
in terms of the individual and collective acts of technocrats. In other words, it had become 
another  example  of  the  philosophy  of  consciousness,  or  the  discourse  of  the  subject. 
According  to  Outhwaite  (1996:  15),  ‘If  rationalisation  is  seen  as  in  this  way,  as  the 
performance of an individual or collective subject, mastering itself as part of the extension of 
its power, there is no obvious way out of such traps.’  
Habermas’s conception of the lifeworld, which he brings to fruition in The Theory of  
Communicative  Action  (1984,  1987b),  represents  a  diagnostic  correction  to  the 
overgeneralisation  of  instrumental  reason.  The  lifeworld  represents  for  Habermas  our 
unspoken background knowledge of the world against which we enter into communication. 
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In addition to being cognitive horizon of meaning, it also represents the complex of everyday 
practices, customs and ideas of a society.  The lifeworld is always oriented to communication 
and is ‘the correlate of processes of reaching understanding’ (Habermas, 1984: 70).  In this 
sense it may also be said to represent an allegorical reconstruction of the public sphere, in  
which the processes of reaching an understanding are a reconstruction of rational-critical 
debate as well as being processes of communicative action.  It is through these processes that 
the lifeworld is symbolically produced and reproduced in a manner reminiscent of Foucault’s 
discursive  formations  (Foucault,  1989 [1972]).  The dialectical  bond of  the  lifeworld  and 
communicative action are counterposed by Habermas to the systems world.  This enables him 
to realise ‘a two-tiered concept of society as lifeworld and as system’ (Habermas, 1992: 444). 
Although they are counterposed to one another, the lifeworld and the systems world are not 
mutually exclusive; they require one another in order to exist.  
The systems world is the world of technocratic consciousness. Habermas represents 
the systems world as existing in a symbiotic, if one-sidedly symbiotic, relationship with the 
lifeworld.  The systems world might imagine itself existing without the lifeworld, but the 
lifeworld must not be allowed to achieve the systemic effacement the systems world, even if 
that seems appealing, because without a systems world we would, according to Habermas, 
exist in chaos, with profoundly negative consequences for social organisation.  In his own 
words, ‘systemic mechanisms need to be anchored in the lifeworld’ (Habermas, 1987b: 154). 
For example, the existence of systems world constructs in the lifeworld, such as the rule of 
law and conceptions of justice and human rights are, according to Habermas, essential, as 
well as welcome, contributions to social organisation.  Equally, a society where all decisions 
had  to  be  universally  agreed  before  they  could  be  implemented  would  quickly  cease 
functioning if  some system of plebiscitory democratic  representation were not  introduced 
(Calhoun, 1992).  
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The principal sources for a perspective of communicative action recontextualised as a 
discursive response to the text are Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979),  the 
first volume of The Theory of Communicative Action (1984), and Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative  Action  (1989c).  Habermas’s  conception  of  communicative  action  is 
encapsulated in the idea of ‘a universal pragmatics’ whose task is ‘to identify and reconstruct 
universal conditions of possible understanding’ (Habermas, 1996: 118).  Having considered 
the possibilities for a reconstruction of the public sphere through institutional democratisation 
(Calhoun,  1992),  Habermas  turns  to  the  general  presuppositions  of  communication,  or 
‘validity claims,’ which in his view are universally present in speech, and which Grice (1975) 
in  another  context  labelled  ‘maxims  of  cooperation.’  Habermas  articulates  these 
presuppositions in a manner which is similar to Grice, but perhaps with less rigour.  For 
Habermas a communicating actor who is oriented to understanding must raise at least three 
validity claims with an utterance, namely:
1. That the statement is true (or that the existential presuppositions of the propositional content mentioned 
are in fact satisfied);
2. That the speech act is right with respect to the existing normative context (or that the normative context  
it is supposed to satisfy is itself legitimate); and 
3. That the manifest intention of the speaker is meant as it is expressed.
(Habermas, 1984: 99)
These  claims  may  be  glossed  as  suggesting  the  following  universal  principles  of 
understanding: 
• comprehensibility (that the speaker is intelligible) 
• truth (that the speaker tells the truth)
• truthfulness  (that the speaker intends to tell the truth)
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• correctness (that against a recognised normative background the utterance chosen by the 
speaker is right and appropriate to the context)
The  model  of  communicative  action  which  is  presupposed  by  these  principles  is 
idealised.   It  is  idealised  because  Habermas  wishes  to  elaborate  from  these  principles 
normative grounds for the possibility of universal consensus. That is, he wishes to use the 
cooperative norms of intersubjective communication as the basis for a universal moral theory 
or discourse ethics; it is therefore a conception of the grounds of universal morality in the 
abstract.   Although necessarily  an  idealisation,  the  process  of  reaching  an  understanding 
requires  that  participants  in  communication  orient  themselves  towards  the  possibility  of 
agreement.   The  theory  of  communicative  action  is  therefore  not  only  a  theory  of  the 
possibility  of  reaching  understanding,  but  also  a  theory  of  reaching  that  understanding 
through a process of discussion.  According to this perspective, if the universal principles of 
understanding are taken as the normative basis of communication, all validity claims raised in 
discussion, or in argument, may be measured for their truth and for their moral rightfulness 
against that normative base.  In this way moral judgements can be made and a universally 
legitimate moral consensus can in principle be reached according to the accepted strength of 
the better argument.
The  importance  of  Habermas’s  discourse  ethics  for  this  paper  is  not  the  moral 
standpoint which it encodes, but its representation of the process of discussion through which 
understanding might be reached.  If the theory of communicative action is read through the 
lens of an orientation to discussion, rather than according to an orientation to agreement, and 
this is done in conjunction with what he has said about rational public discourse and the 
reconstruction  of  the  public  sphere,  Habermas’s  thought  becomes  an  extremely  valuable 
resource for theorising the process of discussion which might follow a critical reading.  This 
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is  because  his  thought  is,  above  all,  about  the  elaboration  of  a  proceduralist  theory  of 
communication: 
The principle  of  discourse  ethics  (D) makes  reference  to  a  procedure:  … Practical 
discourse.  Practical discourse … is a procedure for testing the validity of norms that 
are  being  proposed  and  hypothetically  considered  for  adoption.   That  means  that 
practical discourses depend on content brought to them from outside’ (Habermas, 1996: 
187; original emphasis).  
In a classroom context, what Habermas refers to as a practical discourse is in effect a 
discussion between two or more class members regarding the interpretations which they have 
each arrived at as a result of a critical reading.  These class members, or ‘discussants,’ are 
exchanging information about a common object of discussion, a text, which they have all 
read and analysed according the four stage procedure described earlier in this paper.  In this 
interpretative process they will have attempted to test the validity of norms that adhere to the 
way the text seems to want to be read, its preferred reading.   Taking this further we may also 
say that their interpretations are derived from ‘content brought to them from outside’ in the 
sense that the text has arrived in the classroom from another lifeworld context, for example 
that of a newspaper or magazine, and also in the sense of their background knowledge of the 
world;  without  which  their  interpretations  would  not  be  possible:  ‘It  would  be  utterly 
pointless to engage in a practical discourse without the horizon provided by the lifeworld’ 
(ibid: 187).  The notion of a ‘practical discourse’ is according to Benhabib (1992: 87) the 
defining feature of a public sphere: ‘The public sphere comes into existence wherever and 
whenever all affected by general social and political norms of action engage in a practical 
discourse, evaluating their validity.’  
In The Theory of Communicative Action there are many points where a  proceduralist 
attitude to discussion is apparent.  Habermas informs us that the concept of communicative 
35
action  assumes  interaction  between  at  least  two  subjects  who  are  able  to  establish 
interpersonal  relations  and that  central  to this  task is  the concept  of interpretation:   ‘The 
central concept  of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the 
situation which admit of consensus’ (Habermas, 1984: 86; original emphasis).  Similarly, in a 
discussion relating to the interpretation of a text, classroom discussants are negotiating their 
impressions of (i) the preferred reading of the text and (ii) the extent to which the descriptive, 
representative, and social dimensions of the text are congruent with that initial reading.  The 
proceduralist theme is frequently taken up by Habermas.  One passage in particular seems 
especially relevant, and I have added my own parenthetical gloss to it in order to illustrate 
why it seems an important procedural statement for the purposes of this paper:
A speaker puts forward a criticisable claim in relating with his utterance to at least one 
“world” (text);  he thereby uses the fact that this relation between actor (reader) and 
world (text) is in principle open to objective appraisal in order to call upon his opposite 
number (partner) to take a rationally (textually)  motivated position.  The concept of 
communicative action presupposes language as the medium for a kind of reaching of 
understanding, in the course of which participants (readers), through relating to a world 
(text),  reciprocally  raise  validity  claims  (interpretations)  that  can  be  accepted  or 
contested. (Habermas, 1984: 99)
The  process  of  agreement  in  a  public  sphere  according  to  Habermas  (1992:  446) 
represents the process by which there is ‘a discursive formation of public opinion and will on 
the part of a public composed of the citizens of a state’ (Habermas, 1992: 446).  The idea of 
discursive will formation may be adapted to a discussion of the text insofar as discussants 
attempt to reach some collective understanding of a text, with the difference that they may or 
may not reach an agreement regarding their interpretations.  I call this process of collective 
understanding ‘discursive  knowledge formation.’   Discursive  knowledge formation  is  the 
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pedagogic  outcome  of  a  discursive  exchange  about  a  text,  in  which  other  discussants’ 
observations contribute to a collective ‘constellatory’  impression of the text.  As absolute 
consensus  is  ‘rather  the  exception  in  the  communicative  practice  of  everyday  life’ 
(Habermas, 1984: 100), a collective understanding may be understood as containing elements 
of the consensual as well as the non-consensual.  More important than an undifferentiated 
consensus  is  the  fact  of  an  exchange  of  views,  and  that  class  members  have  oriented 
themselves to the conditions of discussion which apply to the constitution of an educational 
public sphere, or arena of discursive relations.  That is, there should in principle be equality 
of access to discussion, and that students are oriented to the expectation spoken interactions 
in pairs, groups or as a whole class.  
Systems and power
These are primarily  issues  of classroom management;  they are also issues of  power.  All 
classrooms are sites of power and power relations,  particularly between teachers and their 
students, but also in a classroom’s existence within the structural and discursive matrices of 
an educational institution, such as a univeristy. Teachers must plan lessons and apply some 
systemic organisation to their  classrooms and, in order to do so, they must exercise their 
power, and adopt certain roles or ‘subject positions’ when there. In Habermas’s words, ‘The 
competent combination of specialised performances requires a delegation of the authority to 
direct, or of power, to persons who take on the tasks of organisation’ (Habermas, 1987b: 160; 
emphasis  in  original).  The ubiquity of power relations  should not  be seen as  necessarily 
problematic (Chouliaraki, 1998; Mellor and Patterson 2001).  This is because the exercise of 
power and the attendant power relations which cause classroom participants to enter certain 
subject positions, for example as students and as teachers, are what make a classroom what it 
is;  i.e.  a place where people gather to learn.   In this  there are also certain parallels  with 
Foucault. When Habermas refers to the delegation of power, he is referring to the systems 
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world and the necessity of there being some form of organisation for the lifeworld to be able 
to function, and this is not dissimilar to how Foucault sees power as ‘employed and exercised 
through a net-like organisation’ (Foucault, 1980: 98).  It is through the discursive threads of 
power,  and  the  systemic  networks  which  people  enter  into,  that  subject  positions  and 
therefore identities are constructed (Foucault, 1981, 1982).  The argument that some kind of 
system is necessary in order for us to be able to do anything at all may be applied to the  
classroom context where there must be some organisational point from which discussion can 
begin, i.e. a system of pedagogic organisation,  or learning could not occur.  There therefore 
seems to be a possible, if necessarily tentative, coincidence between Foucault and Habermas 
on the question of power because both of them see systemic power as a constraint which 
allows us to act.  Foucault, because power is subjectifying; it establishes the subject positions 
according to which individuals are able to participate in discursive practices; and Habermas, 
because the systems world confers necessary organisational  mechanisms on the lifeworld 
which are needed if the lifeworld is to be able to function. 
We may also see the analogous logic of the systems world and the lifeworld at work 
in  the  methodology  of  deconstruction,  where  the  systems  world  is  in  Derrida’s  hands  a 
minimal consensus which imposes some minimum order on the meaning of the text, and the 
lifeworld  the  opening  orbit  of  deconstruction  and  the  orientation  to  the  ‘Other’  which 
prevents the text from becoming a uniform and unquestioned system of meaning relations.  In 
other words, in a Habermasian vein, we may argue that the task of deconstruction is to erect a 
democratic dam against the encroachment of system imperatives on the interpretation of the 
text,  in  order  that  the  text’s  self-image  can  be  can  be  recorded  and  held  to  account. 
Nevertheless, as with the condition of classroom discussion, critique must start somewhere, 
and for Derrida this somewhere is the nominal system of meaning which is the reading of 
minimal consensus.  
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The reading of minimal consensus corresponds to what Derrida (1988, 1995) calls an 
‘ethics of discussion’ in the reading of texts; that you must respect the text; that you cannot 
just say anything about the text. From this perspective it is possible to argue that in relation to 
Habermas’s systems/lifeworld distinction the reading of minimal consensus in a procedure of 
critical reading is the corollary of a procedural system of pedagogic organisation. They are 
the necessary minimal constraints by which critical action in an educational context is able to 
occur. 
The overlapping orientations of Habermas, Foucault, Adorno and Derrida to notions 
of systemic power and/or of systems are presented in  Fig. 9.  In addition to the systemic 
orientation which each of them has, I have also indicated (i) at what level these are primarily 
applicable (societal, institutional, or textual/objectual), (ii) what the key concepts are which 
may be  associated  with  such an  orientation,  and (iii)  how they enable  a  procedural  and 
systemic orientation to discussion in pedagogic contexts.
Fig. 9. Orientations of power and systems relations in critical reading and discussion
Orientation to 
systemic power and/or 
systems relations
Key concepts Orientation to discussion
Habermas
  
systems world (societal) • technocratic 
consciousness
• instrumental reason
• organisational systems 
• public sphere
• conditions of discussion
• absence of status 
differentials
• rights of participation
• intersubjective 
communication
• a practical discourse
Foucault systemic networks of 
power (institutional)
• discursive formations
• orders of discourse 
• contextual and discursive 
constraints
• subject positions
Adorno self-conception of the 









Derrida a system of minimal 
consensus (textual/ 
objectual)
• an indispensable guardrail 





• an ethic of discussion
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The consensual/non-consensual public sphere: Habermas and Derrida 
Although Derrida and Habermas come from different philosophical traditions, a number of 
writers have pointed to certain coincidences of thought and purpose which seem to make 
possible  the  opening  of  a  dialogue  between  them (Best  & Kellner,  1991;  Norris,  1992; 
Critchley, 1999b; Borradori, 2003).  If ethics is interpreted as a concern for openness, justice, 
truth, and responsibility, and deconstruction as a sustained and critical questioning of claims 
to truth, there does seem to be an ‘ethical Derrida’ as well as a ‘deconstructing Habermas’ to 
be found in and between the lines of their texts.  These are demonstrably shared concerns for 
both thinkers.  Moreover, Derrida’s ethics of discussion may be seen to reinforce and expand 
on Habermas’s conditions of discussion in the public sphere:  
The task is always in principle to render an account and to render reason.  In both cases 
one should mark – in the public space and as rationally as possible – one’s respect for 
the  principle  of  reason.   This  should  be  done  in  principle  …  through  research, 
questioning,  inquiry  that  seeks  the  “true,”  analysis,  presentation  of  what  “is”  or 
exposition of the “facts,” historical narrative, discussion, evaluation, interpretation, and 
putting  all  these  propositions  together  thanks  to  what  is  called  language, 
communication, information, pedagogy, and so forth.  I insist on these two motifs, the 
public space and  the principle of reason, as I have often done. (Derrida, 1995: 427; 
original emphasis).
Derrida and Habermas, at least in this context, do not seem so far apart as they are 
sometimes presented.  If they are closer than they are often given credit for, then perhaps the 
main  difference  between  them  is  their  respective  attitudes  to  political/ethical/textual 
openness.  Although both are oriented to a politics and an ethics of openness, Derrida would 
hope that  it  remains  just  that,  an openness  without  closure,  an  indefinite  opening to  the 
‘Other;’ whereas Habermas would prefer a much more grounded understanding of openness 
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according to which the critical intersubjective adjudication of a just, rational and universally 
legitimating  society  would  become possible.    In  other  words,  where  Habermas’s  public 
sphere  is  oriented  to  universal  consensus,  Derrida’s  is  oriented  to  an  interminable 
questioning. In this  light,  the main difference between them may be not so much one of 
irreconcilability as one of philosophical/rhetorical style and emphasis (see also Norris, 1992). 
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued for a theorisation of procedure in CDA which is derived from 
critical  social theory rather than from SFL.  The exegetic and discursive elements of this 
procedure are a combination of modernist and poststructuralist philosophical perspectives.  I 
think that by bringing these perspectives together it is possible to reduce CDA’s reliance on 
systemic functional linguistics for its procedural attitude to the text, and to move this onto 
more recognisably critical grounds.  The development of this perspective has brought into 
dialogue  some  quite  diverse  philosophical  positions,  particularly  between  Habermas  and 
Derrida on the public sphere, between Adorno and Derrida on interpretation, and between 
Habermas and Foucault on power.  The combination of these perspectives in the procedural 
framework of this paper makes this a CDA with poststructuralist characteristics. 
In  addition  to  being  a  theorisation  of  exegetic  procedure,  this  approach  is  also  a 
theorisation of classroom-based discussion.  In the public sphere of the classroom students 
come together as a constellation in order to exchange their readings of texts, and in order to 
cooperate with one another in the tasks of learning and thinking about knowledge and how it 
is constructed.  To treat the text as a critical object is therefore to obey a set of CRITICAL 
injunctions with regard to any text: 
41
C is for critical.  Be critical; avoid closure
R is for respect. Respect how the text seems to want to be read
I is for interpretation. Interpret the text from within
T is for teaching.  Teach your interpretation to others
I is for investigation. Investigate the interpretations of others
C is for cooperation and communication. Cooperate in order to communicate
A is for analysis.  Analyse the construction of knowledge
L is for learning.  Learn from the knowledge of others
If these injunctions summarise this approach, they also summarise what I see as the 
main  theoretical  contributions  of  Adorno,  Derrida,  and  Habermas  to  this  paper.   This 
discussion has  shown that  each of  these thinkers  have theoretical  perspectives  which are 
opposed to closure.  Adorno’s perspective is one which resists the closure of the self-identity 
of the object; Derrida’s is one which resists the closure of the self-certainty of the text; and 
Habermas’s is one which resists the closure of discursive spaces in the lifeworld.  For Adorno 
and for Derrida the task of identifying what an object or a text wishes us to understand is an 
important starting position in any critical procedure or practice. It is where a critical practice 
may be said to begin.  This task also entails a certain duty of care towards the text, to respect  
what the text seems to want to say.   By showing this respect, critical readers place some 
limits on what can be said, and demonstrate that it is not possible to say just anything at all. 
By  confining  ourselves  to  the  text,  interpretation  therefore  proceeds  from within.  When 
critical  readers  analyse  texts,  they reach individual  interpretative  decisions  as  a  result  of 
following a procedure.  The point is to share these interpretations by teaching them to others,  
and by investigating the interpretations of others in turn.  This should be a cooperative and 
communicative endeavour, but it need not necessarily lead to consensus; the participants in 
discussion can agree to disagree. When class members enter into discussions about texts there 
is a sense in which they are analysing the discursive construction of knowledge because texts 
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are discursive instances  of the contexts which have produced them.   Finally,  by sharing, 
cooperating and investigating texts together, class members may be said to be engaged in a 
practical discourse, and therefore to be learning from the knowledge of others, whether they 
agree with their perspectives or not.  
The  theorisation  of  procedure  which  I  have  presented  in  this  paper  has  had  three 
principal objectives. The first has been to suggest a theorisation of procedure which is based 
on critical  social theory rather than one which is based on SFL.  The second, which is a 
consequence  of  the  first,  is  that  the  framework  which  results  is  intended  to  be  a  more 
accessible model of analysis for educational purposes than CDA approaches which base their 
exegetic procedures on a systemic functional classification of the text. The third is to offer a 
procedural framework which can be used by both teachers and students, and by a wide range 
of other interested groups, when doing critical work with texts.  If only the second and the 
third objectives meet with any success, then that would be a welcome development.  With 
regard to the first objective, I will leave it for others to decide whether the theorisation I have  
presented can fill the critical-theoretical space which was identified at the start of this paper. 
While I hope that this may be so, I am aware that the theorisation I have proposed leaves a 
number of questions open, which I have not properly been able to address.  These concern in 
particular  the  normative  purposes  of  a  CDA which  is  working  within  a  poststructuralist 
perspective and the problem of the performative contradiction which this implies (Habermas, 
1987a, Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, Pennycook, 2001). Can a poststructuralist CDA have 
a normative purpose?  If so, what is it, and how is it really possible to privilege this purpose 
over others? Or to put this another way, on what grounds does CDA claim ‘truth’ to itself, if  
that is what it is? These questions have been a concern of contributors to this journal for some 
time (Rajagopalan, 2004; Luke, 2004, 2005; Rymes et al, 2005).  My feeling is that to look 
for normative grounds in foundational distinctions between what is true and what is false is to 
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seek  what  cannot  be  found,  because  such  normative  grounds  are  extra-discursive  and 
ahistorical, and are therefore outside the orbit of human experience.  Since we cannot take a 
stand on normative grounds, at  least  on any normative grounds which are outside human 
experience,  in  order  for  a  stand  to  be  made,  it  must  be  situated  within the 
ideological/historical/discursive terrain, and not outside it.  Moreover, it should be guided by 
a multiple array of perspectives in social and cultural theory, and not just one.  That is to say, 
rather than putting our faith in an all-encompassing ‘ism,’ we should seek to open new paths 
to new subjectivities through the application of a variety of ‘isms.’  This is what Nietzsche 
meant when he said, ‘we should learn how to employ a variety of affective perspectives and 
interpretations in the service of knowledge’ (Nietzsche: 1968b: 555; original emphasis). How 
we choose which perspectives, or ‘isms,’ to employ will depend on the extent to which they 
add to or detract from what Rajagopalan has called the project of ‘keeping the critical spirit 
open-ended’ (Rajagopalan, 2004: 263).  It is, to recall Adorno (1973: 406), a question of not 
allowing critical practice to come to rest in itself, and therefore also of not allowing texts as 
critical objects to come to rest in themselves either.  This is CDA’s form of hope.1
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